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Abstract—Radiation from outer space can cause soft errors in
microelectronic devices deployed at terrestrial altitudes on Earth.
Cosmic rays entering the Earth’s atmosphere create a complex
cascade of radioactive particles. The most likely form of cosmic
radiation to cause soft errors in microelectronics at terrestrial
levels are neutrons. SRAM-based FPGAs are susceptible to
terrestrial cosmic ray induced soft errors. These soft errors occur
infrequently for a single device deployed at terrestrial altitudes.
When many FPGAs are deployed in a large-scale system, the
impact of these soft errors on reliability can be significant. This
study examines terrestrial cosmic ray induced soft errors and
the effects they can have on large-scale deployment of FPGAs
in cloud computing. Fifteen data-center-like designs were tested
for sensitivity through fault injecting. Sensitivities ranged from
less than 1% to about 12% of randomly injected faults resulting
in unacceptable behavior. A hypothetical but realistic large-scale
FPGA system, with 100,000 node deployed at a high-altitude,
running the most sensitive design would experience the dominant
failure mode of silent data corruption every 3.8 hours on average.
This system would only be able to retain reliability level above
0.99 for about two minutes. Some soft error detection and recover
approaches are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
As cosmic rays enter Earth’s atmosphere, they create a com-
plex cascade of radioactive particles [1]. Less than 1% of the
primary cosmic ray flux reaches sea level [2]. The rest reacts
with particles in the atmosphere to produce muons, protons,
neutrons, pions, and other particles. Muons and pions are
short-lived and the Earth’s magnetosphere greatly attenuates
or traps charged particles, which leaves neutrons as the most
likely cosmic radiation to cause soft errors in microelectronic
devices deployed at terrestrial altitudes [2].
SRAM-based field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are
susceptible to terrestrial cosmic ray induced soft errors [3].
Soft errors do not cause permanent damage to the device, but
they can corrupt the values stored in configuration memory.
When configuration memory is corrupted, the circuit operating
on the FPGA can be altered. Alteration to the operating
circuit can result in unintended behavior. In this way, terrestrial
cosmic ray induced soft errors can cause circuits implemented
on SRAM-based FPGAs to fail.
For low yield deployments of FPGAs in terrestrial appli-
cations that are not mission critical, cosmic radiation may
not present a significant challenge. The likelihood of cosmic
radiation inducing failure in a single FPGA deployment at
terrestrial altitudes is extremely low. On a single moderately
sized FPGA in terrestrial altitudes, upsets in configuration
memory caused by cosmic radiation may occur only once ever
twenty years on average and only a subset of the upsets that
occur will actually cause the operating design to fail.
One the other hand, terrestrial cosmic ray induced soft
errors present a significant challenge to large-scale FPGA
deployments. Large-scale FPGA systems are more sensitive
to terrestrial cosmic radiation ray induced soft errors because
they include a larger number of FPGAs. Previous work has
explored how FPGA soft error rates scale with changes in
deployment quantity and location [4]. As more FPGAs are de-
ployed, the risk of cosmic radiation causing failure increases.
The study presented in this paper examines the impact of
terrestrial cosmic ray induced soft errors on large-scale FPGA
systems within cloud computing. Today, FPGAs are used in
large-quantities in cloud computing systems throughout the
world to perform application specific computation. Soft errors
caused by radiation have been observed in these large-scale
systems [5]. This study examines the actual risk that these
soft errors pose. Experimental data and material used in this
paper are taken from a recent publication of the presented
study [6].
The paper introduces terrestrial cosmic ray induced soft
errors and their effects on FPGA designs. It presents the
observed response of several data-center-like FPGA designs to
upsets in configuration memory through fault injection. Fault
injection data is collected from an example FPGA compute
node that has an Intel Stratix V GX A7 FPGA connected to a
host CPU via PCIe. The observed response is scaled to reflect
what might be observed in a hypothetical but realistic large-
scale FPGA system.
Tested designs ranged in sensitivity from less than 1% to
almost 12% of randomly injected faults causing a failure.
Silent data corruption (SDC), or the corruption of data without
the system being aware, was identified as the dominant failure
mechanism. A large-scale system running a design with 12%
percent sensitivity on a hundred-thousand nodes at a high
altitude, (i.e., Denver, Colorado), would experience SDC every
3.75 hours and could only operate for about two minutes with
a probability of no SDC greater than 99%. This results does
not consider the application of fault tolerance techniques but
some soft error detection and recovery schemes are discussed.
II. TERRESTRIAL COSMIC RAY INDUCED SOFT ERRORS
Radiation from outer space can cause failure in microelec-
tronic devices deployed here on Earth. Space is a harsh radia-
tion environment with heavy-ion particles from the explosion
of novas and supernovas, high-energy electrons traveling near
the speed of light, and protons and other particles originating
from the sun [7]. These cosmic rays enter our atmosphere
and create a complex cascade of secondary particles, of
which neutrons are the most likely to cause soft errors in
microelectronic devices.
The earth’s atmosphere protects its inhabitants, including
microelectronics, from radiation sources found in space. Fig-
ure 1 depicts the Earth’s magnetosphere deflecting and col-
lecting charged particles traveling towards the Earth. The at-
mosphere does not completely prevent radiation from reaching
Earth’s surface, but it does act as a filter and greatly attenuates
the amount of radiation present on the surface compared to
radiation in space. Thus electronics deployed in terrestrial
environments are less likely to experience cosmic ray induced





Fig. 1. Sources of Ionizing Radiation. Adapted from [8].
When a cosmic ray enters the Earth’s atmosphere, several
chain reactions may occur before resulting particles reach
Earth’s surface. It is possible for a primary cosmic ray to
reach the Earth’s surface, but that occurs for less than 1%
of all primary cosmic rays entering the atmosphere. Figure 2
depicts the reaction of a primary cosmic ray with particles in
the Earth’s atmosphere. When the cosmic ray collides with a
particle in the atmosphere a complex cascade of secondaries
results, which include pions, muons, protons, neutrons and
other particles. This shower of particles can in turn react
with other particles, creating tertiary particles, and this pattern
repeats until the array finally reaches the Earth’s surface.
Charged particles get attenuated by or trapped in the Earth’s
magnetosphere. Pions and Muons are short-lived. Thus, the
most likely form of cosmic radiation to cause soft errors in a







Fig. 2. Complex Cascade of Particles from Cosmic Ray Reactions. Adapted
from [1].
When a single energetic particle passes through a microelec-
tronic device, it can deposit a charge that causes an observable
change in the device. This response is known as a single event
effect (SEE) [9]. There are many types of SEEs. Some are
destructive such as a single event gate rupture. Others do not
cause permanent damage to the device such as single event
transients, which appear as short lived power glitches unless
latched into a memory element. The most common SEE in
SRAM based FPGAs are single event upsets (SEUs) where
values stored in memory elements are inverted by the particle
strike.
Radiation effects effect in microelectronic devices are pri-
marily due the funneling phenomenon [7]. This phenomenon is
depicted in Figure 3 and is where an energetic particle passes
through the device and deposits sufficient charge to alter the
flow of current through the device. Neutrons themselves do not
carry a charge. When they collide with other particles in the
device, the reaction releases high-energy ionizing secondary
particles. It is these secondary particles that cause SEUs in
the target device, not the neutrons themselves [2].
Cosmic ray neutrons are not the only source of radiation
that can cause soft errors in microelectronic devices here on
Earth. Alpha particles from contaminants in device packaging
and material can also cause soft errors [2]. Both sources of
radiation should be considered when measuring the effects of
















Fig. 3. The Funneling Phenomenon in an N-Type MOSFET. Adapted
from [7].
plications [9]. Emphasis is given in this paper to high-energy,
(greater than 10 MeV), neutrons due to their prevalence and
variation based on deployment location.
Because cosmic ray and other sources of radiation can
induce soft errors into microelectronic devices, standardized
test procedures and metrics have been develop to quantify the
vulnerability of a component to terrestrial radiation induced
failure. The JEDEC 89A test standard for, “Measurement
and Reporting of Alpha Particle and Terrestrial Cosmic Ray-
Induced Soft Errors in Semiconductor Devices,” provides a
standardized way to test microelectronic devices for the effects
of terrestrial radiation. This standard helps ensure device safety
and regulates awareness of the effects of terrestrial radiation
on microelectronic devices. Microelectronic devices, including
FPGAs, are typically tested by vendors to determine soft error
rates for a given device.
A. Soft Error Rates
The reference value for cosmic-ray-induced high-energy
neutron flux is 13 neutrons per cm2 per hour. This value is
the high-energy neutron flux in New York City (NYC,) at
sea level, outdoors, during a time of average solar energy.
This is the reference flux level that most reports scale soft
error rates to, but high energy neutron flux can vary with
altitude, location in the geomagnetic field, and solar magnetic
activity [9]. Table I shows the relative high-energy neutron
flux at various locations. Increase in altitude, included in the
table, increases neutron flux exponentially. From this data,
taken from [9], it is clear that some locations have significantly
higher neutron flux than other. The White Mountain Research
Station, at 12,500 feet in altitude, has a relative high-energy
neutron flux that is 15× greater than the NYC flux.
When a device is tested using an accelerated neutron
radiation beam, the cross section of a failure mode is measured
by dividing the total number of failures that occur by the total
amount of fluence or radiation exposure. Cross section is a
hypothetical target area that will result in failure if a particle
cross through it and fluence is the total number of particles
that pass through a given area (usually cm2) [7]. Many con-
siderations must be made when testing a complex system with
TABLE I
NEUTRON FLUX AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS
Location Elevation Relative Neutron Flux
Seattle, WA 160 ft 1.05
Moscow, Russia 490 ft 1.14
Chicago, IL 590 ft 1.19
Denver, CO 5280 ft 3.76
Los Alamos Natl. Lab. 7380 ft 5.60
Leadville, CO 10170 ft 10.79
White Mtn. Res. Sta. 12500 ft 15.07
radiation testing [10], but a test can be developed to measure
the cross section of a single upset in the configuration memory
of an FPGA. This cross section can be scaled to estimate the
soft error rates for SRAM-based FPGA configuration upsets
in different locations throughout the globe.
Two common metrics for reporting soft error rates are
failure in time (FIT) and mean time to failure (MTTF). FIT
is defined the average number of failures in one billion hours
of operation [9], and MTTF is defined as the average amount
of time from working operation to failure. The two metrics
are inversely related, a higher MTTF means a lower FIT and
visa-versa. A FIT of 1000 roughly corresponds to a 100 year
MTTF. Soft error rates for large memory arrays, such as the
configuration memory in an SRAM-based FPGA, are often
reported in terms of FIT/Mbit, (i.e., 106 bits).
Cross section measurements from accelerated neutron radi-
ation testing of FPGA configuration memory can be converted
to FIT/Mbit by scaling the results to the amount of neutron
radiation present in the target environment.
FIT
Mbit
= 109 hours× Neutrons
cm2 hour
× Cross Section× 10
6 bits
Megabit
Using this conversion, the NYC neutron soft error rate for
configuration upsets in two similar 28-nm FPGAs is shown
in Table II. Cross section data for this table was obtained
from [3] and [11]. As can be seen from the table, the mean
time to upset (MTTU) for a single deployment of one of these
moderately sized FPGAs at NYC sea level is about 20 years.
This soft error rate scales with the relative neutron flux of the
deployed location (see Table I).
TABLE II
NEUTRON SER FOR 28-NM FPGAS
Device Stratix V GX A7 Kintex 7 325T
CRAM FIT/Mbit 63 74 ± 18%
CRAM Bits ˜99,000,000 ˜73,000,000
CRAM FIT/Device 6,200 5,400
CRAM MTTU NYC 18.3 years 21.2 years
The number of devices deployed in a system also increases
the overall occurrences of upsets in the system. The soft error
rate of a single device does not change as more devices are
deployed, but having more devices deployed increases the
overall soft error rate. Table III show how the MTTU rate
scales linearly with the number of FPGA devices deployed
in a large-scale system. A single Stratix V GX A7 FPGA has
about a twenty year MTTU at NYC sea level, but a large-scale
system with 100,000 of these FPGAs would experience a 1.5
hour MTTU at NYC sea level.
TABLE III
STRATIX V GX A7 MEAN TIME TO UPSET AT NYC SER
FPGAs Years Days Hours Min. Sec. Total
(Sec.)
1 18 127 15 28 27 6E+8
10 1 304 23 8 50 6E+7
100 67 0 30 53 6E+6
1,000 6 16 51 5 6E+5
10,000 16 5 6 6E+4
100,000 1 36 30 6E+3
1,000,000 9 39 6E+2
10,000,000 57 6E+1
B. Effects of Upsets on FPGA Designs
SRAM-based FPGAs are programmable computer chips
that can be configured to implement custom hardware de-
signs. They have an array of resources whose functionality
is controlled by a set of configuration memory bits. These
devices have a set of lookup tables and flip-flops that are used
to implement combinational and sequential logic. They also
can contain a large amount of I/O, digital signal processing
resources, and other sets of custom resources. The components
a design uses, how they should behave, and how they are con-
nected are programmed into a bitstream that gets loaded into
the configuration memory of the device. With the bitstream
loaded, the FPGA will implement the associated design.
When an upset occurs in configuration memory, the un-
derlying circuit implemented on the FPGA can become cor-
rupted. Corruption of values used as the logic equations of
lookup tables can produce erroneous output from combina-
tional logic. Connections between components in routing that
use programmable interconnects can be lost or created where
they should not be. The behavior of flip-flops or other used
components can be altered by corruption of the configuration
bits that govern control signals. The configuration memory
controls the implementation of the underlying circuit. Thus,
corruption of configuration memory in an FPGA can have a
dramatic effect on the correct functionality of the design [12].
Design state stored in user memory elements can also be
corrupted by radiation induced upsets. Table IV shows a
breakdown of state in a Stratix V GX A7 FPGA. Most of
the state in an FPGA is dedicated to configuration memory
(CRAM), but a significant portion is available for use as
large block memories for users (BRAM), distributed mem-
ories (LUTRAM), or as user flip-flops. Some other memory
elements, accessible from user logic, are use to dynamically
configure component behavior. All of this state is susceptible
to radiation induced upsets. An upset is any FPGA state may
cause instability in the implemented design.
C. Architectural Vulnerability Factor
Not all upsets in configuration memory will cause an FPGA
design to behave incorrectly. Correct functionality depends on
the integrity of the underlying circuit. When an upsets occurs
TABLE IV
BREAKDOWN OF STATE IN A STRATIX V GX A7 FPGA
Type Bits Percentage
CRAM 91,170,156 60%
BRAM (M20K) 52,428,800 34%
LUTRAM (MLAB) 7,511,040 5%
Flip-Flop 938,880 1%
in configuration memory, it can alter the the underlying circuit,
but it may also have no effect on the underlying circuit. Having
an effect on the underlying circuit depends on if the upset bit
is associated with the underlying circuit or not and several
other factors. If an upset bit controls the logic equation of an
unused lookup table or another unused resource, then it will
have no effect on the underlying circuit. If an upset does alter
the underlying circuit, masking behavior [13] may prevent the
alteration from causing incorrect circuit behavior.
A main contribution of the presented study is identifying
the architectural vulnerability factor for several data-center-
like FPGA designs. The architectural vulnerability factor or
(AVF) for an FPGA design is the percentage of random upsets
that actually result in unacceptable behavior. This concept is
similar to AVF found in computer architecture [14] and reflects
a down scaling of raw soft error rates to match the radiation
induced failure rate of the design operating on the FPGA.
Another major contribution of the presented work is a
comparison of architectural vulnerability factor against the
percentage of bits reported by vendor tools as being potentially
used by the active design. Vendor tools can classify bits in
configuration memory as being potentially used by the active
design or not. Intel Quartus Prime can generate a mapping
file that designates which bits are critical and which are not.
User can select which hardware modules to include in the
classification and can give unique tags to different regions.
Designating a bit as critical means that it may be used by the
implemented design, but it does not guarantee that an upset
in this bit will cause the design to fail. The presented study
explores the conservative nature of critical bit classification.
III. LARGE-SCALE FPGA SYSTEMS IN THE CLOUD
A single FPGA instance has a relatively low risk of cos-
mic ray induced design failure at terrestrial altitudes, but as
more devices are deployed in large-scale systems at terrestrial
altitudes with higher neutron flux, the risk of cosmic ray
induced design failure increases. Large-scale FPGA systems
in cloud computing provide an interesting case study in which
to examine this behavior. Large-scale deployment of any
technology increases the likelihood of a single node failing.
Increase in soft errors to the point of system disturbance has
been observed in DRAM [15], microprocessors [14], and even
FPGAs [4].
Today, FPGAs are being used in large quantities in data
centers throughout the world to perform application specific
computations. As of August 2017, Microsoft has deployed
hundreds of thousands of FPGAs in their data centers [16].
Amazon now offers FPGA compute nodes in four different
locations with three additional locations recently announced.
Additionally, other companies, such as Nimbix, Baidu, and
Micron, are involved with large-scale FPGA deployment in the
cloud. FPGAs’ presence in data centers for cloud computing
is likely to continue and increase in prevalence [17].
It is common for FPGA nodes in cloud computing to be
coupled with a host CPU or placed on a network as a globally
accessible resource [5]. Figure 4 depicts a common FPGA co-
processor configuration where an FPGA is attached to a host
CPU via PCIe and shared DRAM resources are made available
to the FPGA and host through controller logic on the FPGA.
The FPGA design has a static shell used to support the needed
infrastructure and communication and a region of the device
is reserved and dedicated for different hardware kernels that
will run on the device. This typical configuration was used in











Fig. 4. Typical FPGA Data Center Node
When radiation upsets occur in a computation node such as
this, one of three main failure modes may occur. First, the host
may become unresponsive. Second, the FPGA may become
inaccessible by the host. Third, data returned by the FPGA
may be corrupted and the receiving system may be unaware
of corruption. The third scenario is commonly referred to as
silent data corruption or SDC. All of these failure modes were
observed in fault injection, and a series of recovery options
were employed to bring the system back into a working state.
While the presented study focuses on terrestrial cosmic ray
included soft errors in large-scale FPGA systems within cloud
computing, the presented material and conclusions can be
applied to any large-scale deployment of FPGAs at terrestrial
altitudes. Applications in the automotive, communications,
(e.g., wired and wireless), and other industries can benefit
from better understanding the risks that terrestrial cosmic ray
induced soft error pose on large-scale terrestrial deployments
of SRAM-based FPGAs.
IV. FAULT INJECTION EXPERIMENTS
Fault injection is a commonly used technique that emulates
the effects of soft errors by purposefully corrupting the con-
tents of configuration memory in FPGAs and observing the
resulting behavior. It is used to augment radiation test results
and to better understand the effects that radiation induced
upsets can have on a circuit. When enough fault injection
data is collected to be statistically significant, this data can be
used to estimate the overall sensitivity or AVF of the targeted
design [18]. Fault injection is used in the presented study to
estimate the AVF of several data-center-like designs. Collected
data is compared against vendor classification of bits used by
the design and error rates are scaled to a hypothetical but
realistic large-scale FPGA system.
A diverse set of fifteen benchmarks were included in the
presented study. All of the benchmark designs used in the
presented study originate from designs posted on the Intel
FPGA SDK for OpenCL - Developer Zone [19] and the
Terrasic OpenCL board support package for the DE5-Net
FPGA developer board [20]. Table V lists each of the tested
benchmarks and amount of logic and routing resources that
they utilize. Designs range in size and complexity from a
simple “Hello World” to large computational and memory
intensive designs. Generally speaking, larger designs are ex-
pected to have a higher sensitivity to upset because they use
more resources.
TABLE V
BENCHMARK DESIGN RESOURCE UTILIZATION
Design Total ALMs Routing
FD3D 190,612 (81.21%) 30.50%
Mandelbrot 173,755 (74.03%) 29.40%
Channelizer 145,180 (61.85%) 23.40%
Matrix Multiply 135,405 (57.69%) 28.40%
FFT1D 129,767 (55.29%) 20.80%
FFT2D 121,015 (51.56%) 22.20%
JPEG Decoder 95,250 (40.58%) 17.70%
Compute Score 94,575 (40.29%) 22.10%
Boardtest 57,547 (24.52%) 11.90%
Video Downscaling 50,914 (21.69%) 10.80%
Vector Op 49,503 (21.09%) 9.90%
Vector Add 49,039 (20.89%) 9.70%
Sobel 48,573 (20.69%) 9.20%
Hello World 46,329 (19.74%) 8.60%
Related to design resource utilization, the total number of
critical bits for each design is listed in Table VI. These bits are
designated by vendor tools as possibly used by implemented
designs. The percentage of critical bits should not be confused
with a designs AVF. Critical bits provide an upper bound
on the number of bits in the device that could cause design
failure if upset. AVF provides an estimate on the percentage
of configuration bits that will actually result in design failure
if upset.
The fault injection experiments conducted in the presented
study were performed using the setup shown in Figure 5. A
Dell Precision T7610 server was used as the host. It was
running Window 10 Professional and has two Intel Xeon
processors and 16 GB of ECC protected RAM. The FPGA
accelerator card used is a Terrasic DE5-Net with a Stratix V
GX A7 FPGA. The test operator is an external computer that
monitors design execution and injects faults into the FPGA as
part of the fault injection flow.
The fault injection flow used in the presented study follows
the basic fault injection algorithm presented in [18]. First,
the system is brought into a working state. Then, a fault
is injected into the system. Next, the target application is
executed to stimulate the design under test followed by a series
of diagnostics that determine if the design operated correctly
or not. Observed behavior is recorded, the injected fault is
TABLE VI
CRITICAL BITS
Design Injectable Total Critical
FD3D 98,502,636 69,740,486 (70.8%)
Mandelbrot 98,029,036 66,122,603 (67.5%)
Channelizer 98,534,636 62,673,556 (63.6%)
Matrix Multiply 98,573,036 58,774,590 (59.6%)
FFT1D 98,514,796 57,182,508 (58.0%)
FFT2D 98,439,276 56,797,420 (57.7%)
JPEG Decoder 98,386,796 41,360,019 (42.0%)
Compute Score 98,394,476 44,450,948 (45.2%)
Boardtest 98,578,156 24,009,160 (24.4%)
Video Downscaling 98,587,116 20,934,957 (21.2%)
Vector Op 98,549,996 19,589,044 (19.9%)
Vector Add 98,587,116 19,838,814 (20.1%)
Sobel Filter 98,597,996 19,067,514 (19.3%)
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Fig. 5. Experiment Setup for Fault Injection Testing
repaired, and the system is recovered if necessary to bring it















Fig. 6. Fault Injection Flow
In this experiment, faults were injected before executing
the host application, the host application was allowed to
run completely, and then the injected fault was removed.
Diagnostics made sure the host application ran without error
and that the output of data from the FPGA matched either
a golden copy of data on the host’s hard drive or matched
the output of the same computations run again on the host
CPU. When an injected fault did result in failure, recovery
consisted of removing the injected fault from the device and
trying again, reprogramming the FPGA and trying again, and
power cycling the host and FPGA and trying again until the
system returned back to a working state.
Results from the fault injection campaign are presented
in Table VII. Here the logic resource utilization and the
percentage of bits that are critical are shown side by side.
While these metrics are correlated, having a higher resource
utilization than another design does not guarantee having a
higher percentage of critical bits. The AVF of any failure mode
ranges from less than one percent to almost 12% and is broken
down into the three major failure modes. Silent data corruption
was found to be the dominant failure mode and the percentage
of critical bits were found to overestimate the AVF of a given
design by at least 5×.
V. FAILURE RATE FOR LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS
The AVF for silent data corruption in Table VII is used in
Table VIII to scale the hypothetical SDC failure rates of a
the same designs running on a 100,000 node FPGA system.
The hypothetical system is made up of Stratix V GX A7
FPGAs deployed at high-altitude in Denver, Colorado. In this
environment, the most sensitive design would cause the system
to experience an SDC event every 3.8 hours on average.
TABLE VIII
SDC MTTF ON A 100,000 NODE SYSTEM IN DENVER, CO
Design FIT MTTF
Mandelbrot 266,000,000 3.8 Hours
Matrix Multiply 212,000,000 4.8 Hours
FFT2D 200,000,000 5.0 Hours
FFT1D 193,000,000 5.2 Hours
FD3D 193,000,000 5.2 Hours
JPEG Decoder 80,000,000 12.5 Hours
Compute Score 125,000,000 8.0 Hours
Channelizer 120,000,000 8.3 Hours
Boardtest 80,000,000 12.5 Hours
Video Downscaling 71,000,000 14.2 Hours
Vector Op 61,000,000 16.3 Hours
Vector Add 47,000,000 21.2 Hours
Sobel Filter 31,000,000 1.3 Days
Hello World 2,000,000 2.5 Weeks
Although MTTF provides a useful metric for understanding
the overall failure rate of a system, it does not adequately
represent the fact that many failures in the system will occur
in sooner than the MTTF estimate. Figure 7 shows that 63%
of failures will occur in a time that is less than the MTTF.
A better metric is to estimate the time in which the system
can operate above a pre-specified level of reliability. This
metric is called mission time. It is a function of the minimum
reliability constraints given as a probability from zero to one.
Table IX presents the mission time in seconds for various
minimum reliability constraints of the most sensitive design
running on the hypothetical system. The hypothetical system
would be able to maintain a reliability greater than 0.99 for
approximately 2 minutes. Such a short period may not be
long enough for application tasks to complete and still meet
reliability requirements.
VI. SOFT ERROR DETECTION AND RECOVERY
FPGA vendors provide methods for detecting upsets in
configuration memory and repairing them. These features are
often referred to as configuration memory scrubbing and are
largely based on error correction codes (ECC). Other features
are made available to users to mitigate the effects of soft errors
TABLE VII
FAULT INJECTION RESULTS, AVF FOR SPECIFIC BEHAVIORS (NORMALIZED TO ALM UTILIZATION)
Design ALM Critical Faults Silent Data FPGA Host Any Failure Critical Bits
Utilization Bits Injected Corruption Unavailable Unresponsive AVF to AVF Ratio
Mandelbrot 74% 67% 9,301 11.3% (15.3%) 0.3% (0.4%) 0.02% (0.03%) 11.6% (15.7%) 5.8×
Matrix Multiply 58% 60% 17,094 9.0% (15.5%) 0.5% (0.9%) 0.03% (0.05%) 9.6% (16.6%) 6.2×
FFT2D 52% 58% 5,223 8.5% (16.4%) 0.5% (0.9%) 0.00% (0.00%) 9.0% (17.4%) 6.4×
FFT1D 55% 58% 7,389 8.2% (14.8%) 0.4% (0.7%) 0.18% (0.32%) 8.8% (15.9%) 6.6×
FD3D 81% 71% 8,094 8.2% (10.1%) 0.5% (0.6%) 0.00% (0.00%) 8.8% (10.8%) 8.0×
JPEG Decoder 41% 42% 7,948 3.4% (8.5%) 3.3% (8.2%) 0.14% (0.34%) 7.0% (17.2%) 6.0×
Compute Score 40% 45% 7,310 5.3% (13.2%) 1.2% (3.0%) 0.00% (0.00%) 6.6% (16.3%) 6.8×
Channelizer 62% 64% 10,709 5.1% (8.2%) 0.4% (0.6%) 0.03% (0.05%) 5.5% (8.9%) 11.6×
Boardtest 25% 24% 12,247 3.4% (13.7%) 0.6% (2.6%) 0.03% (0.13%) 4.1% (16.6%) 5.9×
Video Downscaling 22% 21% 11,641 3.0% (13.7%) 0.6% (2.9%) 0.04% (0.20%) 3.7% (17.1%) 5.7×
Vector Op 21% 20% 6,790 2.6% (12.2%) 0.4% (1.7%) 0.04% (0.21%) 3.0% (14.3%) 6.6×
Vector Add 21% 20% 11,623 2.0% (9.6%) 0.4% (1.8%) 0.04% (0.21%) 2.5% (11.7%) 8.0×
Sobel Filter 21% 19% 6,638 1.3% (6.2%) 0.5% (2.5%) 0.03% (0.15%) 1.9% (9.0%) 10.2×
Hello World 20% 18% 15,442 0.1% (0.4%) 0.2% (0.9%) 0.01% (0.03%) 0.3% (1.5%) 61.3×
TABLE IX
MISSION TIME FOR DIFFERENT RELIABILITY CONSTRAINTS
r 0.5 0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9999 0.99999





















63% of failures occur before the MTTF 
Reliability of 0.99 MT 0.99 ≈ 2 minutes
for example system
Fig. 7. Simplex System Reliability Over Time Verses MTTF
on block memories. These features are made available to users,
and signaling of upset occurrence is available in user logic.
How the design responds to an upset event is left up to the
users digression.
In this experiment, when a failure occurs, successive recov-
ery attempts are made until the system is back in a working
state. Removing the injected, which is similar to configura-
tion scrubbing, is tried first followed by reprogramming the
FPGA followed by power cycling both the FPGA and host.
Table X shows the breakdown of recovery techniques that
were successful for recovering the system from SDC failure
occurrence. Scrubbing away the injected bit was very effective
for restoring the system but did not restore the system in all
cases. It is important to note that recovering the system to a




Design Events Scrub Reprogram Power Cycle
Mandelbrot 1,050 99.5% 0.5% 0.0%
Matrix Multiply 1,530 99.2% 0.8% 0.0%
FFT2D 442 99.1% 0.9% 0.0%
FFT1D 606 99.2% 0.8% 0.0%
FD3D 667 98.7% 1.3% 0.0%
JPEG Decoder 273 98.2% 1.1% 0.7%
Compute Score 390 97.2% 2.8% 0.0%
Channelizer 541 98.0% 2.0% 0.0%
Boardtest 412 97.1% 2.9% 0.0%
Video Downscaling 345 94.2% 5.8%, 0.0%
Vector Op 174 95.4% 4.6% 0.0%
Vector Add 233 98.3% 1.3% 0.4%
Sobel Filter 85 90.6% 8.2% 1.2%
Hello World 12 66.7% 8.3% 25.0%
In responding to SEUs in large-scale systems, designers can
take one of several approaches. They could disable configu-
ration scrubbing and respond only when a failure is detected.
This may be useful in situations where SDC is not a great
concern. They could enable scrubbing and only respond to
detected failures. This is a low cost approach that would allow
for more rapid system recovery. They could respond every
time an upset is detected, or they could use vendor designated
critical bits to only respond upsets in critical regions.
Care should be taken when responding to upsets that suffi-
cient data is discarded when an upset is detected. Scrub cycles
are periodic and upsets persist in configuration memory for
half a scrub cycle on average before they are detected by
the scrub engine. During that time, their presence can induce
incorrect behavior in the design and produced data that should
not be trusted. Figure 8 shows a timeline of upset and detection
events that depicts this scenario. At position 1, a scrub cycle
completes with no detected errors. At position 2, an upset
occurs. At position 3, SDC propagates out of the device. At
position 4, a subsequent scrub cycle completes, but already
cleared the location of the upset before it occurred, so no
upset was reported. At position 5, the scrub engine finally
detects and corrects the upset. At position 6, the SDC either
flushes out or persists, and at position 7, the third scrub cycle
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Fig. 8. Scrub cycles, SEU occurrence, and SDC
Several possible SEU response approaches approaches can
be taken. It is advisable to incorporate vendor provided con-
figuration scrubbing into large-scale FPGA systems in the
cloud due to the benefit it provides and the low overhead
it requires. In situations that require high-reliability or im-
proved reliability, additional hardware fault tolerance tech-
niques such as triple modular redundancy [21] or duplication
with compare [22] should be applied. Awareness of the risk
and available detection and recovery mechanisms can greatly
assist large-scale FPGA system readiness to address terrestrial
cosmic ray induced soft errors.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, terrestrial cosmic ray induced soft errors
and the effects they have on large-scale FPGA systems in
the cloud are examined. The soft error rate for configuration
upsets in a single device deployed at terrestrial altitudes is
very low, (about once every twenty year on average for a
moderately sized FPGA), but is significant for a large-scale
FPGA system deployed in terrestrial altitudes. The presented
study examines the architectural vulnerability factor, or the
estimated percentage of configuration bits that will actually
cause undesired behavior if upset, of 15 data-center-like FPGA
designs via fault injection. AVF ranges from less than 1% to
about 12% with SDC as the dominant failure mode, which is at
least 5× smaller than the percentage of bits deemed potentially
used by vendor tools.
Running the most sensitive design on a hypothetical but
realistic large-scale FPGA system with 100,000 Stratix V GX
A7 nodes at high-altitude in Denver, Colorado, would cause
the system to experience SDC with a 3.8 hour MTTF. This
system would be able to maintain a probability of no SDC
greater than 0.99 for approximate two minutes. Several possi-
ble soft error response schemes were discussed and designers
of large-scale FPGA systems are advised to incorporate vendor
provided configuration scrubbing into their terrestrial cosmic
ray induced soft error response approach. For application
that require improved reliability, additional soft error fault
tolerance techniques should be applied.
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